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EEL: A Brief Presentation 
The Laboratory of Experimental Economics was created in 1991 within the Department of 
Economics of the University of Trento. Its initial purpose was to conduct experiments in 
analysis of organizational behaviour - which is still its principal area of interest although 
others have recently been added, most notably study of the formation of choice behaviour in 
demand for consumer goods and decision-making in the fiscal and distributive area. 
The original idea was to develop models of 'organizational learning' which describe the 
growth of organizational and informational structures in firms and institutions, and to conduct 
analysis and empirical verification utilizing recent techniques developed in the field of 
Experimental Economics. This purely experimental work is now flanked by analysis in the 
theoretical area of the organization and the firm. Particular emphasis has been placed on the 
development of models of information structures in firms and on the representation and 
simulation of the multi-actor decision processes that unfold within them, at the managerial 
and planning level and also from the point of view of consensus formation. 
The work of the Laboratory has fully borne out the decision to conduct research from 
three different disciplinary points of view: (a) that of the cognitive sciences, in order to 
deepen understanding of learning processes by means of laboratory experiments and in order 
to model the knowledge transfer mechanisms that characterize organizational learning; (b) 
that of the theory of decision support for the understanding and formulation of the preferences 
leading to the decision: (c) that of organizational analysis in order to study the emergence of 
different forms of cooperation and the solution of cognitive and decisional conflicts. (d) that 
of institutional economics, to move into the direction of explaining the rise of economic 
institutions on the basis of new micro-foundations. 
One indirect aim of the project is to develop a research agenda in a coordinate way with 
various groups sharing the same methodological approach. Among these groups several 
Italian universities are involved (Ch Bembo at Venice, Political Science at Turin, the 
University of Genoa, the Bocconi University of Milan, the Universities of Modena and 
Trento). The Laboratory is also cooperating in systematic manner with a number of 
international research centres, in particular with the following groups: BACH (University of 
Michigan), CSOM (University of Amsterdam), Dynamics of Computation Group (Palo Alto), 
SCANCOR (Stanford University), CCE (University of California, Los Angeles). 
The Laboratory gratefully acknowledge the support received from The University of 
Trento ("Progetto Speciale") and The Italian Ministry of University and Research ("MURST" 
40%). 
More information on Laboratory's research is available on INTERNET at the location: 
http://black.cs.unitn.it 
Abstract 
This paper presents a preliminary investigation of the relationship between the process of 
functional division of labour and the modes in which activities and plans are coordinated. We 
consider a very simple production process: a given heap of bank-notes has to be counted by a 
group of accountants. Because of limited individual capabilities and/or the possibilities of 
mistakes and external disturbances, the task has to be divided among several accountants and 
a hierarchical coordination problem arises. 
We can imagine several different ways of socially implementing coordination of 
devided tasks. 1) a central planner can compute the optimal architecture of the system; 2) a 
central planner can promote quantity adjustments by moving accountants from hierarchical 
levels where there exist idle resources to levels where resources are insufficient; 3) quasi- 
market mechanisms can use quantity or price signals for promoting decentralized adjustments. 
By means of a simple simulation model, based on Genetic Algorithms and Classifiers 
Systems, we can study the dynamic efficiency properties of each coordination mode and in 
particular their capability, speed and cost of adaptation to changing environmental situations 
(i.e. variations of the size of the task and/or variations of agents' capabilities). Such interesting 
issues as returns to scale, specialization and workers exploitation can be easily studied in the 
same model. 
Paper presented at the Second International Symposium "Simulating Societies '93", Certosa di Pontignano, 
Siena, July 24-26, 1993. in N. Gilbert (Editor) Simulating Societies, UCL Press. 
Division of Labour and Social 
Coordination Modes: 
A Simple Simulation Model 
Massirno Egidi* and Luigi Marengo** 
" .... I still believe that, by what is implicit in its reasoning, economics has come nearer than 
any other social science to an answer to that central question of all social sciences: How 
can the combinations of fragments of knowledge existing in different minds bring about 
results which, if they were to be brought about deliberately , would require a knowledge on 
the part of the directing mind which no single person can possess? To show that in this 
sense the spontaneous actions of individuals will, under conditions which we can define, 
bring about a distribution of resources which can be understood as if it were made 
according to a single plan, although nobody has planned it, seems to me an answer to the 
problems which has sometimes been metaphorically described as that of the "social 
mind"." 
(Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, in Individualism and Economic Order ; Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 54) 
1 Introduction 
Division of labour and coordination 
It is customary to consider economic organizations as social systems which make 
coordination of individual plans and decisions possible. Little attention has been instead given 
to the connection between forms of coordination and a dynamic process which has been 
characterizing industrial societies: the process of increasing division of labour. 
The fact that the two processes have been somewhat connected in their historical 
development is hardly questionable: as economic organizations increased the degree of 
division of labour and knowledge, the problem of coordination between a rising number of 
increasingly inter-related producers and decision makers became more and more complex. 
Coordination of distributed decisions by markets, firms and other economic institutions 
appears as the other side of the process of division of labour. 
The historical evidence still does not clearly show whether the two processes have co- 
evolved as two aspects of the same phenomenon or have mainly proceeded independently, in 
terms of both temporal and causal relationships (cf. Polanyi 1958), but some evidence at the 
microeconomic level - such as analyses of the processes of design and managerial planning in 
modern corporations - seem to support the hypothesis of co-evolution. In economic 
organizations in which planning and design are highly purposeful activities, division of labour 
and coordination are the joint result of these very activities. But can the hypothesis of co- 
evolution of coordination and division of labour be extended also to the cases in which - both 
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in markets and in organizations - they are not the outcome of a purposeful planning and 
design process, but are emergent and partly unintended properties of the interaction between 
distributed decision-making activities (cf. Hayek 1948)? 
Behind this question lie two different ways of conceiving the division of labour: 
1. as the outcome of a single mind, which designs, devides and coordinates: this is the 
view behind the Marxian capitalist and the Schumpeterian entrepreneur; 
2. as the emergent, unplanned and unconscious outcome of the interaction of local and 
incomplete decisions. 
We believe that an intermediate form can be found is real large business organizations, 
where both the two forms, top-down conscious design and bottom-up decisions whose 
outcomes are partially unintended, co-exist in a mixed and complex way. To understand why 
this is so we have firstly to take into considerations the role played within them by routines 
and contracts; both routines and contract are necessarily incomplete and partly tacit , and this 
implies that noticeable discretionary margin must be left to the actors and incompleteness and 
tacitness bring about cognitive conflicts. 
To be persuaded, suppose that the top management puts into place a re-design of the 
organization is in order to react to some kind of environmental change. The implementation of 
the new division of labour within the organization which is required by such a change gives 
rise to a complex process of adaptation which is far from what believed by the traditional 
theoly of planning: from one hand in fact the implementation of a new organizational design 
requires managers and employees to re-think their jobs and revise their competences; from the 
other, to be effective, any new design requires local checks and readjustments , i.e. the 
resolution of cognitive conflicts arising from the match among the general requirements of the 
project and the specific, idiosincratic knowledge arising from the personal knowledge of any 
single agent. 
This require to briefly discuss the role of managers : for what has been said, we cannot 
clearly separate i~zaizaging by doing: 
"... the blue collar worker on the most routinized assembly line must repeatedly make 
decisions about how to handle nonstandard situations, and in particular when to call one to 
the attention of the supervisor. On the other hand, sales managers, in addition to managing 
their salespersons, often spend considerable amounts of time with clients, engaged in 
selling, and thus in "doing" " (Radner 1992). 
"Doing", i.e. the application of a given routine, is never a mere execution of given rules but 
always involve some discretionary behaviour, if anything because a fully specified routine, 
which does not leave any space for autonomous decision-making, would require an endless 
list of contingent behaviours. The essence of managerial activities seems rather to lie in the 
capability to fill knowledge and information gaps and in the capability to design the 
organization of labour and "imagine how to do". 
Therefore top-down plans - which are necessarily incomplete for reasons we will 
discuss below - have to match pieces of knowledge and skills which are largely local and tacit 
and therefore they inevitably have a largely uncertain and unintended outcome. 
Before to discuss the reasons of the incompleteness of planning , it is useful to note that, 
when considered in its connections with the process of division of labour, the very notion of 
coordination takes a different meaning from the one implicit in neoclassical economics. For 
the latter coordination means making individual and independent decisions compatible, here 
instead the problem of coordination concerns the relationship between the top-down activity 
to design new organizational set-ups and the adaptive, intelligent bottom-up reactions by 
managers and employees, which should give rise to a better adaptation of the organization to 
the external environment. 
Division of labour, distributed knowledge arzd specialization 
The analysis of the process of division of labour as a primary determinant in economic 
development, goes back to Adam Smith and lies at the heart of classical economics. But little 
of these early analytical efforts have been continued in modern neoclassical economics, and 
have been brought back to their central role only within recent non-neoclassical studies of the 
process of technological evolution (cf., for instance, Dosi et al. 1988). 
A possibly fruitful way of interpreting the process of division of labour is to consider it 
within the general framework of the theory of problem-solving. From this point of view, the 
division of labour can be interpreted as a process of decomposition of problems into sub- 
problems to be solved independently. Direct observation of the behaviour of organizations and 
individuals as problem-solving activity - within the tradition initiated by March and Simon - 
suggests that such behaviour is a peculiar and unstable balance between two opposite 
situations: on one side purely routinized behaviour, in which a series of operations are 
repeated again and again, on the other side an active and conscious search for solutions to new 
problems or new solutions to old problems faced by the organization. 
Without entering the vast debate on how to formally represent problem-solving 
activities, some general points are worth mentioning for their relevance to the subject of this 
paper. 
First, problem solving activity is characterized by a search in the space of problems, 
which generally leads to the decomposition of the original problems into at least partially 
independent sub-problems. If such a decomposition is feasible, sub-problems can be solved in 
a parallel way and subsequently coordinated: the original problem is therefore decomposed 
into a set of connected sub-problems. In the language of economics and organization science, 
this corresponds to the expectation that the decomposition of a production process (lato sensu) 
into independent sub-systems, which can be dealt with in relative isolation and in parallel, will 
lead to increasing returns, in spite of the coordination costs which the decomposition bring 
about. 
Second, the working hypothesis we propose - along the lines of Simon and March - is 
that the search in the problem space, based on the division of the given problem into sub- 
problems, is a model for the division of knowledge ; even if division of knowledge and 
division of labour are not the same process ( two employees cooperating in the same 
organization can have the same competences and largely overlapped knowledge but divided 
and different jobs) the former is necessary to the latter. 
Third, it must be emphasised that the search in the space of sub-problems is a highly 
uncertain and conjectural process. In fact, when a problem has decomposed into a set of sub- 
problem, generally not all the sub-problems will be immediately solvable and consequently 
they will be in turn decomposed into simpler ones. The decomposition then recursively 
proceeds until all the relevant sub-problems have been solved. The procedure by 
decomposition is therefore a conjectural one for the two following reasons: 
a) there no set of decomposition rules which a priori allows agents to achieve a certain 
result; 
b) subjects can verify the solvability of the original problem only when all the relevant 
sub-problems have been solved (cf. Egidi 1992). 
This implies that plans and projects within firms are not merely executed by different subjects 
but they necessarily require a multi-agent process of learning and adaptation which can 
involve cognitive conflicts among the different actors. 
These feautures allow us to consider coordination within organizations as the 
complementary part of the division of knowledge and labour which follows the realization of 
a new project; the further the division of labour proceeds, the more the different divided parts 
require coordination and the more information becomes dispersed. A crucial problem then 
arise: can we assume that the coevolution of division of labour and coordination take place 
also within markets? 
A first approach (cf. Coase 1937) would claim that markets coordinate only (by means 
of price mechanisms) whereas the division of labour is entirely performed within 
organization. A more careful examination would suggest that the two processes take place in a 
complementary way in both the organizational set-ups, market and business organization, the 
main difference being the degree of awareness which characterizes the actors of the process. 
The context of shumpeterian competition is a good starting point to clarify how division 
of labour and cordination can take place in the market: suppose that a cluster of product 
innovations arise in the economic system. If the new products substitute old intermediate 
goods, they will activate the modification of the routines involved and a "second generation" 
of adaptive innovators will arise: they in turn , by using the new products will produce either 
new goods or the old ones in a new manner. In the first case, a dynamic innovation process 
arises, in which new projects lead to the modification of other projects. It must be noticed 
that, it is not merely a matter of spreading of an innovation. On the contrary, what we are 
describing is an "avalanche" of innovations which are activated recursively by the original 
cluster of innovations. As a consequence of the original innovative actions two different 
"responses" of the system could occur. The first, without altering the basic structure of the 
division of labour, gives rise to local dynamic processes. In other cases, - often going beyond 
the intentions and the expectations of the innovators - the reaction of the system causes a new 
definition of division of labour, knowledge and competences within the economic system. 
This clarifies how a new division of labour and knowledge can take place within 
markets. Moreover, it bring us to a crucial point: the coordination process by market stroilgly 
involves the transmission of knowledge and competences: prices does not convey sufficient 
information to support coordination processes which follow a division of labour. 
This importance of this point and the provisional conclusion we have reached are 
reinforced if we consider an intermediate organizational set-up , as does Williamson in his 
"fundamental transformation". When two or more contracting parts (business enterprises) 
engage into a new common project, this normally will require an improvement in human and 
physical assets internal to each enterprise, and a transfer of knowledge among the enterprises. 
The emergence of sunk costs in phisical and human capital guarantees the strength of the links 
among the parts. Even in this case, the relationship among firms which takes place in the 
market will involve not only price signals but also (and fundamentally!) the transmission of 
pieces of knowledge and information ; conflicts and bargaining between the parties will most 
likely solved by using the voice option instead of exit (Hirshman). 
As Simon points out 
Markets represent only a part, if an important part, of the channels of communication and 
coordination between organizations (Mattioli Lectures, forthcoming). 
The moral of this part of the story is that the transfer of knowledge and competence is a 
fundamental aspect of coordination which take place not only within organizations but also 
among organizations on markets. 
Even if we believe that to try to shed light on the properties of division of labour and 
coordination, and on their co-evolution can add some useful clarification to the matter , to 
model this kind of process is far our capacities and intentions. More modestly we intend to 
pick up some of the properties discussed above , and try to compare the performances of 
different coordination forms which arise from the division of knowledge and labour in a 
context of boundedly rational behaviour. In the next two sections the relevant assumptions 
will be formally discussed. 
Divisiort of labour artd returns to scale 
A fundamental question which has been already hinted at is whether and under which 
conditions sub-problem decomposition - that we suggest as a useful representation of the 
process of division of labour - can generate more efficient form of organization of production. 
This question can be answered in many different ways: one of first analyses was provided by 
Simon (1962) with his parable of the two watchmakers, called Tempus and Hora. Watches are 
complex objects made up of a very large number of small pieces, Tempus just assembles his 
watches sequentially and every time he is disturbed - for instance by his clients' phone calls - 
he has to start the assembly all over again. Hora instead proceeds by first assembling subunits 
of only a few components and then putting them together, every time he makes mistakes or is 
disturbed by external events he will have to start again assembling only the current subunit. 
His average completion time for a watch will be therefore much shorter than the one of a 
watchmaker who does not divide the task into subunits and has to start again from the 
beginning every time he makes a mistake. 
In this example there is a clear advantage in the division of labour: when a perturbation 
occurs in a sequential system, it affects the whole system, when instead it occurs in a system 
made up of small independent and parallel sub-units it will not propagate outside the affected 
sub-unit. But if we rule out the possibility of perturbations and mistakes, this advantage 
disappears and the parallel system seems rather less efficient because of its higher 
coordination costs. Only if we consider the positive long-term effects that the division of 
labour might have on the individual working capability, because of learning-by-doing and 
specialization, can we again find advantages of an increase of the degree of task 
decomposition. Learning seems therefore a key factor in explaining the division of labour. But 
how do individual learning processes coordinate in a framework in which the very definition 
of tasks is an emergent property I ?  In the remaining part of the paper we will investigate this 
question by means of a very simple model of division of labour and a few simulations of 
different social coordination mechanisms. 
2. Division of labour in the accountants' model 
We try to elaborate on some of the points outlined in the previous section by means of a 
simple model of organization, which will be then made a little richer. The model is the 
accountants' model suggested by Sobel (1992) and directly addresses the problem raised by 
Simon's parable of the two watchmakers. 
Suppose that the problem to be solved is counting an unknown and possibly very large 
number of items, for instance dollar bills, and deliver a correct answer. Each accountant is 
characterized by a certain productive capacity, i.e. the number of bills he can successfully 
count in a given time interval, or, alternatively, by a certain probability of making mistakes, 
which we can plausibly assume to increase with the time he spends counting, because he gets 
I The problem of coordination of learning processes within an economic organization has been also studied, in a 
framework in which the division of labour is given, in Marengo (1992). 
more and more tired and error-prone, and/or more and more bored and likely to have his 
attention turned away from his job. In the first case the accountant cannot simply work 
anything more than his productive capacity, in the second he has no given limit, but the 
likelihood of him making a mistake will increase with the size of his workload. If an 
accountant makes a mistake and does not realize it, he will jeopardize the result of the entire 
counting process, if he is aware of the mistake he will instead be forced to start again counting 
from the beginning. In all these cases - as already discussed in the introduction - splitting the 
task into sub-task is necessary to ensure the efficacy and efficiency of the production process. 
Of course the decomposition of the global task into subtasks must be technically 
possible, which is usually the case only to a certain extent, in the sense that there are usually 
technical indivisibilities. Our example of the counting bills problem is in this sense a very 
simple one because of the total decomposability of the problem into whatever subtasks of 
whatever dimension, limited only by its integer size (i.e. the minimum subtask is counting one 
bill and no less). 
Suppose that the global task is to count a stack of N bills of one dollar. Suppose also 
that each accountant can successfully count at most k bills in a given time interval, at the end 
of which he issues a new bill whose face-value corresponds to the amount of one dollar bills 
he has counted (at most k). Such bills are put in a new smaller stack and can be counted by 
other accountants who will issue new higher-valued bills and so on and so forth, until a stack 
of "fictitious" bills is obtained whose size is no bigger than k and can be therefore entirely 
counted by one single accountant, who will be able to announce the total number. 
Let us illustrate the problem with a trivial example: suppose that N=10,000 one dollar 
bills is the size of the task and all accountants have a counting capacity of k=10 bills. We will 
need therefore L1= 1000 accountants at the first level, who will count the 10,000 bills and 
issue 1000 bills of face value $10 and put them in a new stack. To count this new stack L2= 
100 accountants are needed, who will now issue 100 bills valued $ 100 and put them in a new 
stack which needs L3= 10 accountants to be counted. Finally only one accountant (L4= I)  is 
needed to count these 10 bills of $ 1,000 and finally announcing the result of the entire 
counting process. All in all we need 11 11 accountants to complete the task in 4 time units, and 
we obtain a perfect pyramidal subdivision of subtasks. 
More in general, if N=kn , i.e. the size of the task is an integer power of the individual 
productive capacity, the optimal hierarchical structure is formed by 
n = logN / log k 
levels, each of them formed, respectively, by 1, k, k2, ....., kn-l accountants. 
In less special cases the ratio log N / log k is not an integer number and therefore the 
number n of levels of the pyramid will be the first integer greater or equal to such ratio, this 
implies that the pyramid must necessarily contain some slack resources which cannot be fully 
exploited 2: let us consider a general task of size N bills, if every accountant can count up to k 
bills, the lower level of the organization will produce N k  bills, the second ~ / k 2  and so on up 
to level w such as N/kW I k. If we have exactly N/kW = k all resources in the pyramid will be 
fully exploited, otherwise the productive capacity of the accountant at the top of the hierarchy 
will not be entirely exploited. Moreover the numbers Nlk, ~ / k 2  .... N/kW might not be all 
The presence of such idle resources is a possible reason for the existence of economies of scale i n  this 
technology: a multiplicity of tasks can in fact be internalized in one single organization, which can therefore 
reduce the amount of idle resources. In the above example, two separate tasks of 5,000 $ would be more 
efficiently handled by a single organization rather than separately. But this issue lies outside the scope of this 
paper. 
integer: some idle resources will therefore appear at each level for which the ratio is not an 
integer number. 
The ratio between size of the task N and total amount M of labour required for its 
completion is given by 
n R(k) = NIM = kn I l+k+k2 .... kn = (1-k)k I 1-k n+ 1 
thus R(k) + 1 as n + w and the process exhibits asymptotically constant returns to scale. 
If the number N of bills to be counted increases, the organization can respond by 
increasing the level of employment andlor the productive capacities k. The latter can increase 
also with N constant (increase of productivity, or marxian exploitation). 
3. Division of labour and coordination 
If, as argued in the previous section, dividing complex tasks into sub-tasks to be handled 
separately is usually necessary andlor more efficient than carrying it out altogether, this very 
process of division of labour determines a growing and non-trivial coordination problem. The 
previous section analyzed some formal properties of a toy model of division of labour and 
showed under which condition a pyramidal structure can implement an optimal sub-division 
of a given task. In this section we examine instead how such a structure could emerge in 
different institutional set-ups and adapt to random environmental disturbances. 
Generally speaking, we can imagine at least three different ways of attaining 
coordination: 
a) a central planner can use the model outlined in the previous section to design the 
optimal organization and adapt it to changes of the size of the task andlor changes of the 
workers' capabilities. To perform this task, he or she needs to know at every moment in 
time the exact values of every worker's productive capacity and the size of the global 
task 3. 
b) a boundedly rational central coordinator, instead of attempting an exhaustive plan, can 
adaptively adjust the organizational structure by moving workers where needed. Such a 
coordinator can operate as a sort of Walrasian auctioneer: he or she receives messages 
on all the flows between the different levels of the organization and on unused resources 
and moves workers in such a way as to fill the gaps between demand and supply 
between adjacent levels of the hierarchy. 
The information requirements of this boundedly rational coordinator are quite different from a 
fully rational central planner's: while the latter needs precise information about the size of the 
overall task and the characteristics of each accountant, the former needs information on all the 
flows between different hierarchical levels. It must be also pointed out that whereas the 
central planner needs precise information - as even small amounts of noise will make the 
entire organization ineffective - the boundedly rational coordinator will generally only need 
some signals (even qualitative ones) on supply-demand disequilibria. Moreover this 
boundedly rational coordinator can be also fully replaced by inter-level coordinators which 
take care only of the demand-supply equality at one interface between levels regardless what 
happens in other parts of the organization. 
This requirement seems rather paradoxical. Indeed if the planner knew exactly the amount of bills to be 
counted there would be actually no need to carry out the counting process. Although less strikingly, this paradox 
arises also in less caricatural production processes. Fully centralized and exhaustive planning would require 
perfect knowledge of every aspect of the production process: only in this case could the coordination problem be 
solved in the planner's mind without the need of local adjustments. 
As to the kind of cognitive capabilities which are required by the two different kinds of 
decisions which the central planner and the boundedly rational coordinator have to take, the 
former has to develop a highly abstract and general decision rule. This involves that the 
problem has been understood in its general features and decomposed into sub-problems. The 
boundedly rational coordinator on the contrary can adaptively implement the organizational 
structure, with a process of trial and error which can proceed without a general understanding 
of the problem (cfr. Dosi and Egidi (1991), Dosi et al. (1994)). 
But the process of adaptive coordination involves a cost, given by the loss of efficiency 
incurred during the very process of adaptation. While in fact the perfectly rational central 
planner computes the optimal organization in his mind, the central coordinator carries out the 
design process in real time and corrects mistakes only after experiencing the loss of efficiency 
they cause. 
On the other hand if the central planner makes mistakes, these are likely to damage 
more persistently the organization, because the latter is unable to process signals which detect 
the presence of inefficiencies and adjust consequently, and thourough re-design is always 
needed even to cope with small perturbations. 
c) coordination can be achieved also with a completely decentralized mechanisms, a quasi- 
market in which each accountant adjusts his production andlor his position according to 
quantity andlor price signals which are independently processed by each individual. 
Each interface between levels of the organization constitutes a market where the 
accountants of the lower level sell the "fictitious" bills they produce and the accountants 
of the higher level buy them. Demand and supply in each of these markets depend on 
the number and productive capacity of the accountants at the two levels. Suppose, for 
instance, that the overall productive capacity at the lower level is not sufficient to supply 
the accountants at the higher level with enough bills, some of'them will not be able to 
produce enough because of insufficient input level and will therefore tend to move to 
other parts of the organization. These adjustments could take place simply through 
simple quantity signal or through a more complex price mechanisms of Marshallian 
type (for instance: excess demand generates a price increase which raises the profits of 
sellers, this attracts new sellers who make the supply increase and balance the initial 
excess demand). 
A decentralized coordination mechanism of this kind requires only local information 
processing: each accountant can autonomously process disequilibrium signals according 
solely to his own local information (knowledge about his own characteristics) and without any 
need of directly knowing other accountants' characteristics. On the other hand such a 
mechanism requires a strong system of incentives: the search, by all the agents, for maximum 
profits. Finally, as in the case of a central coordinator, also decentralized coordination takes 
place through costly adjustments in real time. 
To summarize, in case a) all the decision-making capability is concentrated in the 
central planner's mind, who has developed a highly context-independent coordinating rule (n 
= logN 1 logk). The accountants in the organization do not even have the possibility to send to 
the central planner signal of inter-level disequilibria. In case b), on the contrary, the central 
coordinator follows a behavioural routine based on disequilibrium signals sent by the 
accountants 
In the next section of the paper we will study, by means of a simulation model, how 
coordination could emerge as an adaptive property in the different environments defined by 
centralized and decentralized coordination mechanisms and explore some of their properties. 
4. Division of labour and the emergence of coordination: 
a simulation model 
In the present section some of the properties of the coordination modes outlined in the 
previous section will be further investigated by means of a simulation model of adaptive 
learning based on Genetic Algorithms and Classifiers Systems (cf. Holland 1975 and 1986, 
Goldberg 1989, Holland et al. 1986). 
Let us consider a population of h accountants. Each of them is characterized by two 
variables: his position in the hierarchy (i.e. the integer number which identifies the 
hierarchical level where the agent is placed) and his productive capacity (i.e. the maximum 
number of banknotes he can count in a given time interval). Both variables can be encoded by 
their binary representations: in our examples we have used a six-bits string to represent each 
accountant: the first three bits for his position in the hierarchy (levels 0 to 7) and three bits for 
his counting capacity (from 0 to 7 banknotes for unit of time). The i-th accountant is 
represented by the string: 
Ai: p lp2p3klk2k3 p,k E {O,l} 
a set of h of such strings provides therefore, at each moment in time, a complete 
representation of the organization whereby the position in the hierarchy (level) and the task of 
each individual (productive capacity) are specified. 
Accountants can both move (or be moved) across hierarchical levels and modify their 
productive capacity according to signals of input-output disequilibrium either at the 
individual (in the case of decentralized coordination) or at the inter-level interface (in the case 
of a boundedly rational central coordinator). Such signals, appropriately interpreted, constitute 
the condition part of the adaptively learning system. 
1) case of the boundedly rational coordinator: the boundedly rational central coordinator is 
able to adapt the entire organization according to signals of disequilibrium/equilibrium at the 
interface between different levels of the hierarchy. He can be thus represented by a set of 
condition-action rules where the condition classifies such signals and the action defines a 
complete organizational structure. More in details we have: 
environmental messages (equilibrium/disequilibrium signals) are given by the 
catenation of 8 binary strings (one for each inter-level interface, including the interface 
between the last level and the "final demand).  Each one of these 8 sub-strings is 
composed by 2 digits: 
S1S2 s E {O,l J 
where the first digit is set to 1 when there exist an excess supply at that interface and is 
set to 0 otherwise; the second digit is set to 1 when there exist an excess demand at that 
interface and is set to 0 otherwise. 
conditions are therefore strings of the same length (16 bits) as the environmental 
message which they classify: 
Cl lC12C21C22 C8lc82 c E (O,l,#} 
action parts are binary strings of length 6h which, as already mentioned, define a whole 
organizationally structure: 
An adaptive and boundedly rational central coordination can be in this way represented 
by a classifiers system. Here we just briefly remind its basic features (more details can 
be found, for instance, in Holland 1986, Holland et al. 1986, Goldberg 1989) 
The adaptively learning system, which in our case is a model of a boundedly rational 
central coordinator, is a system of condition-action rules such those so far described. In 
addition, each rule is attributed a strength coeffcient - which, as a first approximation, 
measures how successful1 that rule has been in the past - and a swecificitv coefficient (the 
number of bits in in the condition part which are different from the wild card #) - which 
measures the strictness of the condition, meaning that the smaller is the cardinality of the set 
of environmental messages which satisfy that condition, the higher is its specificity (the 
highest specificity belonging to rules whose condition are satisfied by only one environmental 
message). 
This set of rules is processed along the following cycle throughout the simulation 
process: 
1. Condition matching: a message is received from the environment which informs the 
system about the disequilibriurn/equilibrium conditions at the inter-level interface. Such 
message is compared with the condition of all the rules and the rules which are matched, 
i.e. those which apply to such a state of the world enter the following step. 
2. Com~etition among matched rules: all the rules whose condition is satisfied compete in 
order to designate the one which is allowed to execute its action, i.e. to implement the 
organizational structure specified by its action part. To enter this competition each rule 
makes a bid based on its strength and on its specificity. In other words, the bid of each 
matched rule is proportional to its past usefulness (strength) and its relevance to the 
present situation (specificity): 
Bid(Rj,t) = kl(k2 + k3Specificity(Rj)) Strength(Rj,t) 
Where kl,k2 and k3 are constant coefficients. The winning rule is chosen randomly, 
with probabilities proportional to such bids. 
3. Action and strength uwdating: the winning rule executes the action indicated by its 
action part and has its own strength reduced by the amount of the bid and increased by 
the payoff that the action receives, given the occurrence of the "real" state of the world. 
If the j-th rule is the winner of the competition, we have: 
Strength(Rj,t+l) = Strength(Rj,t) + Payoff(t) - Bid(Rj,t) 
4. Generation of new rules: the system must be able not only to select the most successful 
rules, but also to discover new ones. This is ensured by applying "genetic operators" 
which, by recombining and mutating elements of the already existing and most 
successful rules, introduce new ones which could improve the performance of the 
system. In this way new rules are constantly injected into the system and scope for new 
opportunities is always made available. Genetic operators in our simulations - as in 
standard classifiers systems - are crossover and mutation. 
2) case of the decentralized coordination: in this case each accountant can automously move 
across the hierarchical levels of the organization and change its own productive capacity 
according to individual signals of disequilibrium. Some kind of market mechanism is thus 
necessary to generate such local signals which reflect global disequilibria. One of the simplest 
ways in which such a quasi-market could operate is by delivering quantity signals through 
rationing: if at an interface between levels there is an excess demand, some (possibly all) of 
the accountants of the higher level will not be able to get all the bank-notes they would like to 
and will be subject to rationing on the demand side. If instead there is excess supply, some 
(possibly all) of the accountants of the lower level will not be able to sell all the bank-notes 
they would like to and will be subject to rationing on the supply side. 
Thus, in this case, each accountant is an independent decision-maker which can be 
modelled by an autonomous classifier system, and the links between the different classifier 
systems are given by such rationing signals. Each accountant is thus represented by a set of 
condition-action rules where the condition classifies such signals and the action defines his 
own position/capacity pair. More in details we have: 
environmental messages (equilibrium/disequilibrium signals) are in general different for 
each accountant and given by a two-digit binary string: 
S1S2 s E  IO,lI 
where the first digit is set to 1 when the accountant has been rationed on the demand 
side (i.e. there exist an excess demand at the interface between that accountant's level 
and the lower one) and is set to 0 otherwise; the second digit is set to 1 when the 
accountant has been rationed on the supply side (i.e. there exist an excess supply at the 
interface between that accountant's level and the higher one) and is set to 0 otherwise. 
conditions are therefore strings of length 2 bits which classify such environmental 
messages: 
c1c2 c E IO,l,#I 
action parts are binary strings of length 6 which define the accountant's position in the 
hierarchy and his productive capacity: 
P 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~  1 k2k3 P , ~ E  {0,11 
Each one classifier system of this type is then processed exactly through the execution 
cycle already described for the centralized coordination case. 
The two coordination systems have been tested in a simple problem: the task is to count 
25 bills, there are 6 accountants, whose capacity can vary between 0 and 7 banknotes and 
whose position in the hierarchy can vary from level 0 to level 7. Level 0 is a stand-by 
position: accountants in this position do not enter the production process 5 .  Let us examine 
more in details the nature of the environmental signals which characterize the two institutional 
set ups: 
1. in the case of the boundedly rational central coordinator, the winning rule's action part 
is decoded in order to obtain the corresponding organizational design. The productive 
capacity of all the accountants which are placed at the hierarchical level one is then 
summed up, in order to obtain the total demand of bank-notes at this level. If such total 
demand is smaller than 25, the environmental message will signal, in the following 
iteration, an excess supply (the first digit will be set to 1 and the second to 0) If, on the 
contrary, the total demand is bigger than 25, the environmental message will signal an 
excess demand (the first digit will be set to 0 and the second to 1). Only if the total 
Markets with prices are much more complex and to model them correctly we should introduce a series of 
hypotheses on individual utility functions, which would take us quite far from the core issue of the paper. 
The possibility of exiting the organization must be necessarily allowed if we want the system to be able to 
adjust opti~nally also when more accountants exist than the optimum number. 
demand is equal to 25 will the environmental message signal an equilibrium situation 
(both digits set to 0). The total supply of level 1 can now be computed in this way: 
- if the total demand is smaller or equal to 25, all accountants of level 1 will be able to 
fully exploit their own productive capacity and thus the total supply will be given by 
a number of notes equal to the number of accountants, and each of them will have a 
face-value equal to the productive capacity of the accountant who produced it; 
- if instead the total demand is bigger than 25, some accountants (randomly chosen) 
will be unable to fully use their own productive capacity. Total supply will be given 
by a number of bank-notes equal to the number of accountants of the first level who 
received at least one bank-note and the face-value of each of them will be given by 
the amount of used productive capacity of the accountant who produced it. 
Once the total supply at the interface between levels 1 and 2 has been so computed, we 
can determine the total demand as, again, the sum of the productive capacities of all the 
accountants who are placed at level 2 of the hierarchy. We can then set the third and fourth 
digits of the environmental message according to the disequilibriurn/equilibrium situations 
which are thus realized. The same procedure can be repeated for all the organizational level. 
At the last level we will suppose the existence of a "final" demand of one bank-note of face 
value 25. If more bank-notes are offered, an excess supply will be signalled and the face-value 
of the only purchased bank-note will determine the overall payoff to the organization: if such 
value is equal to 25 the organization (i.e. the winning rule) will receive a positive payoff, 
otherwise it will receive a negative payoff proportional to the absolute difference between 25 
and the face-value itself. 
2. in the case of decentralized coordination inter-level supplies and demands are computed 
in exactly the same way, but environmental messages are separately determined for each 
accountant, by means of a random rationing, as explained above. If, for instance, at a 
given interface between level demand is higher than supply, supplied bank-notes are 
assigned, one by one, to a randomly chosen accountant who has still some unused 
productive capacity. All accountants on the supply-side will therefore have sold all the 
bank-notes they produced, and at the following iteration will receive a message whose 
second digit is set to 0. As to the accountants on the demand side, some (possibly none) 
of them will have been given all the bank-notes they required and at the following 
iteration will receive a message whose first digit is set to 0, the others (possibly all of 
them) will find themselves with at least a part of their demand unmet and at' the 
following iteration will receive a message whose second digit is set to 1. The 
organizational payoff is in this case distributed to all the accountants' winning rules 
through a bucket-brigade mechanism (cf. Holland 1986). 
Simulations have been carried out in order to test the adaptive performance of the 
systems in different environmental conditions. Let us briefly examine the main results. 
1. A first set of results concerns the simplest situation of an error-free and stationary 
world. The stack of bank-notes to be counted contains always 25 notes and no mistakes 
can happen in the counting process, i.e. the counting can always be performed without 
any disturbance and the face-value of the output always equals the amount of used 
productive capacity. In this situation the centralized coordination mechanism is 
considerably more efficient in finding the optimal structure as far as both the speed of 
convergence to an effective organizational design and its stability are concerned. 
It must be pointed out that the structure of the payoff function plays a crucial role in 
determining the speed of convergence and the type of organization which emerges. In 
particular, punishments for unused productive capacities are essential for reducing slack 
resources, and a payoff function decreasing in the total task-completion time is 
necessary to obtain an equal distribution of capacities across agents. 
2. In error-prone environments instead accountants can make mistakes. Two different 
kinds of mistakes are possible. In the first case accountants are aware of the mistakes 
they make and correct them by re-starting the counting process: random disturbances 
can happen during each accountant's counting task and force him to start his counting 
process all over again. In this case the payoff function contains a penalty for the time 
(steps of the counting process) taken to perform the overall task. A second type of 
mistake is instead represented by a random variable (with mean 0) which may cause a 
deviation between the amount of productive capacity used by an accounatnt and the 
face-value of the bank-note he produces. In this case accountants are not aware of the 
mistakes they make and deliver a result which is not correct. 
In both cases the decentralized mechanism is more efficient: local adjustments seem therefore 
to increase the efficiency at coping with local disturbances. 
5. Conclusions and directions for further research 
So far we have pointed out that the division of labour determines a hierarchical structure of 
tasks of pyramidal form. Does this structure directly relate to power relations within 
organizations, i.e. is the hierarchical system of tasks division connected to the hierarchical 
system of power and control? The answer is, generally speaking, no. The pyramidal structure 
of our example emerges only from functional relations (each agent has to use a multiplicity of 
inputs coming from different agents) and is independent of control and power relations. But, 
on the other hand, the very shape of the pyramid can have some important consequences on 
the relationship between agents. The number of agents in fact decreaeses as we climb the 
hierarchy and thus, if the relations between to adjacent levels are managed by a market, such a 
market cannot be a competitive one because of its strong asymmetry. Market power will be 
higher for agents placed in higher hierarchical positions. 
In our simple model we have supposed that movements of workers across hierarchical 
levels can take place instantaneously and at no cost: this is clearly a mostly unrealistic 
hypothesis. Different positions in the hierarchy require different capabilities and knowledge of 
different routines. There is likely to be a trade-off in the organization between the time a 
worker takes to learn the routines connected to a different hierarchical level and the increase 
of production time and number of mistakes due to increase of individual work loads. 
Moreover in real organizations also the type of knowledge required at different 
hierarchical is normally quite different: higher levels in the hierarchy involve a broader but 
less precise kind of knowledge (regardless the actual intellectual capabilities of workers). The 
division of labour usually involves a strong cognitive asymmetry between different levels of 
tasks as a part of the general decomposition of knowledge: this element does not appear in our 
accountants' model. 
Finally, real economic organizations always possess some mechanism of control, whose 
task is to spot elements which do not work properly either because of real problems or 
because of opportunistic behaviour and a parallel and connected system of incentives which 
tries to avoid the appearance of such problems. 
All this elements should be embodied in our model (which could become a sort of 
"beehive" rather than accountants' model) to make it more realistic. 
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